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Abstract 
 
This article examines a particular mode of agri-food governance: international food standard 
setting.  Sociological accounts of technical regulatory processes such as standard-setting can 
help to illuminate the role of expertise in the governance of the agri-food system.  Firstly, the 
potential contribution of the concept of epistemic communities to the analysis of international 
food standard setting is discussed.  Secondly, the article details the architecture of 
international trade regulation and the operational procedures of the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission (the Codex), the intergovernmental organisation in which international food 
standards are set.  Thirdly, the role of scientific expertise to the standard setting process in the 
Codex is explored through a case-study of the attempt to establish an international definition 
for dietary fibre,.  The article concludes by reflecting upon the importance of contestation 
over knowledge claims to the conduct of agri-food governance.    
 
 
 1 
Introduction 
 
The governance of the agri-food system continues to be a major source of debate in 
this journal.  In response to Goodman (1999), Marsden (2000) has proposed that    
agri-food studies should consider the highly differentiated co-ordination of individual 
and institutional actors operating in the governance of the agri-food system.  Such 
actors frequently act across integrated, transnational agricultural and food sectors.  
However, the emphasis of many recent agri-food studies has been upon localised food 
networks.  This article aims to contribute to the on-going analysis of the governance 
of the agri-food system at the international level through an examination of a 
particular mode of agri-food governance: international food standard-setting.  As 
Busch (2000) has noted, standards set norms and conventions and in doing so help to 
configure the behaviour of many actors involved in the governance of the agri-food 
system.  In this regard standards are political and technical devices. 
The article examines the influence of transnational networks of experts – 
termed epistemic communities – in the setting of international food standards as 
established in the Codex Alimentarius Commission (the Codex).  The Codex is an 
intergovernmental organisation jointly administered by the UN Food and Agricultural 
Organisation (FAO) and the World Health Organisation (WHO).  Essentially, the 
main activity of member governments who participate in the Codex is the negotiation 
and settlement of international food standards.  These standards are referenced by 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreements and so constitute a quasi-legal form of 
regulation (Veggeland and Borgen, 2005).  The article details a case-study of the 
standard setting process in the Codex Committee on Nutrition and Foods for Special 
Dietary Uses (hereafter the Nutrition Committee), focusing in particular upon the 
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agreement of an international definition for dietary fibre.  The empirical material used 
is derived from observations, interviews and document analysis carried out during 
2007 and 2008.  Observations of the conduct of meetings were undertaken as a public 
observer.  Forty interviews were conducted with scientists, government delegates and 
food industry and consumer group representatives.  The operation of Codex occurs, in 
part, through the distribution of written comments and papers, and analysis of these 
and related documents was completed.   
The analysis suggests that despite new institutional configurations which seek 
to formally guide iterations between science and policy-making, the division between 
scientific expert and policy-maker is still mobilised as a rhetorical device.  At the 
same time, this rhetorical division is transcended in the standard setting process, 
though not as a result of new institutional configurations in the Codex.  Instead, the 
contested nature of knowledge claims used in the setting of contentious standards 
means that authoritative claims to knowledge are not self-evident and a single source 
of scientific advice cannot provide a resolution.  The difficulty in establishing 
authoritative knowledge claims poses particular challenges to the concept of epistemic 
communities.  In conclusion it is asserted that the contestation of knowledge claims is 
a central activity in the governance of the agri-food system and one that requires 
further conceptualisation. 
   
 
International policy and epistemic communities 
 
The importance of self-organising networks of expertise to international policy co-
ordination - such as the formulation of international conventions, agreements and 
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standards - has been identified by some international relations scholars using the 
concept of epistemic communities (see Adler (1992), Haas (1992a, 1992b and 2004) 
and Hasenclever et al. (2000) for example).  Frequently, international policy co-
ordination occurs around scientific and technical issues, such as food safety, 
environmental pollutants or communicable diseases.  These issues require the input of 
specialists in order to provide evidence on the scientific problem.  The concept of 
epistemic communities has been employed to develop various analyses of how 
international agreements are formulated in particular policy domains through the 
contribution of these expert groups.  Haas (1992a, p. 3) defined epistemic 
communities as “...a network of professionals with recognised expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge within the domain or issue-area”.  He also set out the four characteristics 
which epistemic communities exhibit.  They are: a shared set of normative and 
principled beliefs; shared causal beliefs; a shared notion of validity; and a common 
policy enterprise.  The first three characteristics are principally internal to the 
community.  Normative and principled beliefs give the epistemic community a social 
rationale – they become certain that the correct application of their understanding will 
be 'for the best'.  Causal beliefs are central to the epistemic community concept and 
are produced by claims to truth being challenged within the community until an 
agreed understanding about 'how this problem is manifest' is reached.  Finally, the 
ways in which causal beliefs are assessed is the validation of knowledge, in other 
words the criteria for assessing truth claims.  From these internal mechanisms, an 
epistemic community becomes actively engaged in a common policy enterprise.  This 
is the focus of practice for the epistemic community – it is where their communal 
expertise is directed.   
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Epistemic communities are deemed important when international problems are 
associated with scientific and technical uncertainty, in policy arenas in which 
problem-solving ideas can have a significant impact upon decisions.  International 
food standard setting is clearly one such domain.  If primacy is given to shared causal 
beliefs as the underpinning principles of epistemic communities, then epistemic 
communities only exist when scientific or technical knowledge is required.  Without 
the need for science to provide analysis supporting particular knowledge claims, there 
is no reason for an epistemic community to exist.  Epistemic communities only come 
together around scientific and technical uncertainty and are, therefore, particularly 
important when the governance of a policy domain involves science and technology.  
Importantly, epistemic communities are regarded as possessing authoritative claims to 
knowledge as transmission-belts of like-minded scientists (Haas, 2004).  
Uncertainty over scientific and technological questions poses particular 
problems for international policy-making.  In such situations, the formation of an 
epistemic community with an authoritative claim to knowledge can be influential in 
producing consensus around their particular judgment.  Haas (1992) regards the 
concept of epistemic communities as possessing commonalities with Kuhn’s notion of 
a scientific paradigm (Kuhn, 1962) and Fleck’s notion of a thought collective (1979), 
in that is emphasises the role of shared knowledge in the formation of groups.  The 
concept makes an important contribution in revealing that knowledge – in particular 
scientific and technical knowledge – has a formative role in the production of 
international regulation.  In this regard, the concept can be usefully employed to 
explore the process of setting international food standards.  However, by suggesting 
that the claims to knowledge are held by epistemic communities are authoritative – 
that is they are can provide a ‘knock-down argument’ (Pinch and Bijker, 1984) - the 
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concept appears to be less robust in areas of contention or controversy.  Despite 
focusing attention upon the importance of knowledge to international policy-making, 
it has been suggested that the concept of epistemic communities fails address how 
expertise and authority come to be produced through on-going epistemic and political 
contestation (see Jasanoff, 1996; Antoniades 2003; Gupta, 2004; Lahsen, 2004 for 
example).  The assertion here is that the concept gives too much emphasis to 
consensual scientific knowledge and as a result fails to engage with the means by 
which groups of experts exert (or fail to exert) authoritative claims to knowledge.  Of 
particular relevance to these critiques is the notion of boundary work, which suggests 
that activities are undertaken to identify who is inside a knowledgeable group and 
who is outside and thus establish authority over knowledge claims (Gieryn, 1983).  In 
addition, competition between regulatory systems in international policy-making 
ensures that knowledge claims must be negotiated rather than asserted (Majone, 1989)  
However, as Bostrom and Klintman (2008) note, although the authoritative 
knowledge claims of scientists and scientific groups are increasingly open to 
challenge, a consensual scientific basis for decisions is regarded as essential in many 
policy domains.  Formally, standard setting in the Codex is in-keeping with a model 
of science-based policy-making.   
In the remainder of this article, the concept of epistemic communities will be 
used critically to examine the agreement of an international definition of dietary fibre 
in the Codex Nutrition Committee.  In particular, the ability of scientific experts to 
form an influential group based upon authoritative knowledge will be considered.  It 
is suggested that, in this case-study, the contested and negotiated process of standard 
setting means that an epistemic community could not be established.  Instead the 
process is characterised by the production, articulation and contestation of knowledge 
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claims from various sources.  However, before interrogating the specifics of the       
case-study, it is necessary to set-out the policy framework into which international 
food standard setting is situated. 
 
International trade regulation as a policy framework 
 
International trade regulation has become an important site of agri-food governance 
and forms the policy framework for the case-study presented in the following section.  
Since the completion of the Uruguay Round of international trade negotiations in 
1986, international forms of public regulation have come into force under the 
administration of the intergovernmental World Trade Organisation (WTO).  Food 
production subsidies, food import tariffs, food export subsidies, food safety, food 
quality and food provenance are all covered by this suite of international agreements.  
Trade regulations have potentially far-reaching effects on the structuring of the agri-
food system across member countries and regions.     
The dynamic of these agreements is orientated around the reduction and 
eventual removal of all 'barriers' to trade, often referred to as a trade liberalisation 
imperative.  This is the primary aim of the WTO and therefore member governments 
of the WTO must deal with this regulatory pressure, underpinned by a dispute 
settlement mechanism which allows member governments to challenge the regulatory 
decisions of other member governments.  So-called tariff barriers to trade - such as 
import tariffs, export subsidies and domestic support payments - have been reduced 
across most member nations in recent years, following the prescriptions of the WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture (AoA).  The AoA was formulated with the intention of 
reducing domestic state support for agriculture, improving market access for 
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agricultural imports and reducing subsidies provided to agricultural exports.  Ebrill et 
al. (1999) demonstrate that revenue from taxation on international trade as a 
proportion of GDP fell across the OECD countries from 1975-1995, suggesting that 
import tariffs applied by richer countries are having less effect on trade.   
Tariff barriers to trade are not the only forms of trade policy which have been 
subject to WTO disciplines.  Vogel (1995) identifies that non-tariffs barriers are 
affecting an increasing percentage of food imports worldwide.  Non-tariff barriers are 
many and various, depending upon the scope of definition and can include national 
import control systems and support payments for rural development activities, such 
those promoted in the CAP.  They also include technical barriers to trade.  Within the 
category of non-trade concerns, the term technical barriers to trade is applied to 
regulation in the form of technical standards and guidelines.  It should be noted that 
this term does carry an assertion about the merits of non-trade concerns as barriers.  
Technical barriers to trade in food are particularly fraught with tensions.  According 
to Stiglitz (2006, p. 94): 
 
Of all the non-tariff barriers, this is the most difficult to deal with.  Governments have 
a right – and an obligation – to protect their citizens, and distinguishing between 
protectionist uses and legitimate standards is not easy.  Some have called for the use 
of 'scientific' standards, but it is not even clear what should be acceptable levels of 
tolerance of risk.     
 
As a result of the rising contention over technical barriers to trade, international food 
standards have assumed a heightened significance.  Such non-trade concerns are 
increasingly viewed as major elements of trade regulation and comprise those 
mechanisms of trade regulation which are not applied directly to traded goods.  The 
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issues dealt with by the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (SPS) and the 
Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT) are non-trade concerns,  
The SPS and the TBT Agreements have placed a new emphasis upon 
standards which are set in international institutions.  The WTO administers the 
agreements but it does not directly set technical standards.  The SPS agreement deals 
with the protection of human, animal and plant health as impacted by international 
trade, while the TBT agreement is relevant to food products when considering quality 
issues other than safety, such as food product labelling, packaging, content 
specifications, production processes and conformity to technical regulations 
(mandatory) and standards (voluntary).  The SPS agreement ties all WTO Member 
states to a shared legal framework for producing regulation to deal with threats to 
health from international traded products and, similarly, the TBT invokes a shared 
framework for product specification.  Both these legal frameworks are dependant 
upon standards agreed in international institutions.   
In theory, compliance with the SPS and TBT agreements is straightforward.  
So long as a member state of the WTO complies with the international standards 
referenced by the SPS and TBT agreements then no trade disputes with other member 
states ought to occur.  In practice this is a much more complicated affair.  Besides the 
scope for varying interpretations of the SPS and TBT agreement and the standards 
they reference, the standards themselves have to be agreed upon through negotiations 
between states in other international organisations.  For agri-food commodities and 
products these organisations are the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex), the 
World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and the International Plant Protection 
Convention (IPPC).  Therefore, different institutions exist in which member 
governments are involved in a continuous dialogue to create and amend international 
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standards for food products and for animal and plant health.    Under the SPS and 
TBT agreements all national regulations should be based on scientific evidence 
produced by risk assessment, whether the regulations in question conform directly to 
standards agreed in the relevant international organisations (e.g. Codex), or whether 
national standards conform to higher safety standards.  While the aspiration of the 
SPS and TBT agreements is the harmonisation and convergence of regulation, there 
remains scope for flexibility in the interpretation of the prescriptions.  The referencing 
of such institutions within WTO agreements heightens the significance of the 
guidelines and standards which they adopt.   
 
A mode of agri-food governance: standard setting in the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission 
 
As detailed above, the international food standards negotiated in the Codex under the 
WTO regime are an important mode of agri-food governance.  According to Ilcan and 
Phillips (2006: 66) the Codex is “one of the most explicit devices for standardising 
food through a scientific-based process linked to risk aversion”.  It has been suggested 
that international organisations such as Codex have significant impacts upon national 
regulatory systems (King and Narlikar, 2003), while others emphasise the variable 
influence of Codex standards, depending upon the issue and country in question (Post, 
2005).  Despite the significance of international food standards, little work has been 
undertaken to examine how they are constructed and how this construction relates to 
the harmonisation process.  Although international food standards impact upon the 
structure of the agri-food system, the technical discussions involved in their 
production, and the international fora in which these discussions take place, means 
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that the origin and negotiation of standards is frequently obscured.  In such regulatory 
contexts, characterised by scientific and technical debate, the concept of epistemic 
communities suggests that transnational networks of scientific experts can become 
highly influential.  The strength of this assertion is investigated in the remainder of 
this article by examining the standard setting process in the Codex Nutrition 
Committee, focusing in particular upon the agreement of an international definition 
for dietary fibre. 
 
The Codex: organisation and process 
  
Standard setting within the Codex is formally divided between risk assessment, risk 
management and risk communication, which form a framework for risk analysis.  In 
the procedures of the Codex, government delegates, who negotiate standards within 
Codex committees, are defined as risk managers who have responsibility for risk 
management (Codex, 2007a).  Risk management, so defined, constitutes the policy-
making domain of Codex.  Figure 1 shows the basic organisational structure of Codex 
committees.  
 
PLACE FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Risk management activities take place in the committees shown in Figure 1.  At the 
top of this organisational structure sits the Codex Alimentarius Commission (hereafter 
the Commission).  The Commission is the final committee in which Codex standards 
are approved and adopted, though a variety of national and international meetings take 
place throughout the year in the production of a Codex standard.  
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Codex committees take scientific advice from groups which exist outside of 
the organisational structure presented in Figure 1.  Those who provide scientific 
advice are termed risk assessors and have responsibility for risk assessment.  The 
division between risk management and risk assessment in the risk analysis framework 
used by Codex (the other component, risk communication, is not discussed here) has a 
procedural function in assigning standard setting tasks to particular groups of experts.    
Following Codex procedures, scientific activity and discussions in the Codex ought to 
be restricted to the domain of risk assessment.  Expert groups exist to provide 
scientific advice as requested by Codex committees.  Primary responsibility for risk 
assessment is said to rest with these expert groups, which deal with requests for 
scientific evidence made by risk managers working within Codex committees. 
A number of expert groups exist on a permanent basis.  These groups work to 
provide Codex committees with evidence when requested.  However, not all Codex 
committees have a corresponding, permanent expert group.  For those Codex 
committees dealing with issues of nutrition, methods of analysis and veterinary drug 
residues, no permanent expert groups exist.  In such cases, Codex committees seeking 
the input of risk assessors can make a request to FAO/WHO for advice.  Advice may 
require a new consultation to be conducted.  Alternatively,  the FAO/WHO may deem 
that relevant scientific advice has already been produced as part of on-going work.  
The division within Codex between risk assessment and risk management 
places pressures upon the FAO/WHO to ensure that scientific advice is available in 
order for standard setting activities to be conducted within Codex.  If scientific advice 
is requested by a Codex risk management committee then FAO/WHO should be able 
to provide this.  If a Codex risk management committee has a corresponding expert 
group, it should at least be clear where the request should be directed to.  For those 
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Codex risk management committees without a corresponding expert group, the 
relationship between the committee and the FAO/WHO, as risk assessors, becomes 
more uncertain as there is no formal organisational relationship between these 
committees and FAO/WHO.  Risk management activities conducted in Codex 
committees should be undertaken on the basis of scientific advice from FAO/WHO.  
If this advice is not available from FAO/WHO, but advice is still required, then other 
expert groups may become more influential in the standard setting process.  These 
expert groups can be international advisory bodies, such as the European Food Safety 
Authority (EFSA), international professional organisations or national scientific 
advisory boards and institutions.   
 
Iterations between science and policy-making  
 
Concern to clarify the status of FAO/WHO expert advice prompted the 
publication in 2007 of the FAO/WHO Framework for the Provision of Scientific 
Advice on Food Safety and Nutrition (FAO/WHO 2007).  This framework recognises 
that scientific advice from the FAO/WHO provides an “essential foundation” (p. 4) 
for work within the Codex committees, which is conducted within the “international 
risk analysis paradigm” (p. 4).  While adhering to the original risk analysis paradigm, 
the framework also recognises that risk analysis is an “iterative process and 
interaction between risk managers and risk assessors is essential.” (p. 5).  The 
recognition of an iterative process hints at a more ambiguous division between 
science and policy-making than that suggested by the formal separation of risk 
management and risk assessment.  Further, the incorporation of risk assessment policy 
into the Codex risk analysis paradigm, as adopted in 2003 (Codex 2003), goes some 
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way to confirming this.  Risk assessment policy recognises that decisions should be 
taken to establish the criteria upon which risk assessment takes place.  As Millstone 
(2009) notes, the explicit recognition of risk assessment policy unsettles previous 
institutional distinctions between science and policy-making, though this does not 
necessarily mean that risk assessment is conducted on the basis of prior and explicit 
policy agreements.  Indeed, Millstone et al (2008) identify various styles of risk 
assessment policy at work across particular jurisdictions and suggest that, within the 
Codex, risk assessment policy has not been conducted.  
Risk assessment - the explicitly scientific territory of standard-setting - is not a 
stable set of scientific advisory practices in Codex.  Risk assessment itself is a term 
used to describe processes which establish levels of acceptable levels of safety for 
chemicals in food and assess risks posed by food-borne pathogens in specific 
circumstances and, as a product of scientific advice, exists alongside other products 
such as evaluation, guidelines, interpretations, information and methodologies.  The 
risk analysis paradigm is therefore not only enacted through an iterative process 
between science and policy-making, but can also include the interpretation of science 
in order to produce evaluations, recommendations and guidelines.  Different modes of 
FAO/WHO scientific advice (such as standing expert groups, ad hoc consultations, 
expert meetings and scientific updates) can be used to inform the standard setting 
work conducted in Codex committees and this is done using different products of 
scientific advice (such as risk assessment, guidelines and evaluations reports).  The 
operation of scientific advice to some Codex committees is not rigorously structured 
and is dependant upon the issue in question.   
In order to examine how scientific advice is used, the following section details 
the attempt to agree a definition for dietary fibre in the Codex Nutrition Committee.  
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The case-study challenges the presumption that authoritative claims to knowledge can 
be established in isolation from the negotiation of standards.  In this respect, the 
concept of epistemic communities pays insufficient attention to be processes by which 
scientific evidence and advice is mobilised within the negotiation of international food 
standards.  
 
Standard setting in the Codex Nutrition Committee: defining dietary fibre       
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
The Nutrition Committee is a Codex committee, hosted by Germany, which deals 
with standards pertaining to the nutritional and dietary aspects of internationally 
traded food.  Recently, other Codex member states have hosted the committee 
(Thailand in 2006 and South Africa in 2008) although Germany has continued to 
perform the majority of chairing and secretarial duties, alongside the Codex 
secretariat.  The standards agreed in the Nutrition Committee can place new 
requirements upon food producers and manufacturers, change consumer demands and 
perceptions and provide new market opportunities for food companies.  Since the late 
1990s negotiations have taken place within the Nutrition Committee to agree an 
international definition for dietary fibre as part of a Codex standard covering nutrition 
claims. 
In the Codex risk analysis framework, the Nutrition Committee is a risk 
management committee, with government delegates negotiating the appropriate 
content of the relevant standards.  In terms of risk assessment, there is no standing 
expert group which provides advice to the Nutrition Committee.  Scientific advice on 
nutrition had been provided by the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Nutrition 
(JECN) until 1974.  Since then, scientific advice on nutrition has been provided by 
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Joint Expert Meetings on particular nutrition topics as requested.  As there is no 
standing expert body for the Nutrition Committee, it is unclear where scientific advice 
on nutrition should be produced.  In the words of one government delegate “who is 
our risk assessor?” (Interview, November 2007)  In addition, the Nutrition Committee 
itself has been asked to provide scientific advice to other Codex committees, such as 
the Food Labelling Committee, and on such occasions has had difficulty in providing 
a timely response.   
Since 2004 the Nutrition Committee has undertaken work to define principles 
by which risk analysis for nutrition should be conducted.  The development of these 
principles will be crucial to the formal relationship between science and policy-
making.  Work on this has been completed and the ‘Draft Nutritional Risk Analysis 
Principles and Guidelines’ are due to be adopted by the Codex Commission in 2009.  
If agreed the principles will cover the provision of scientific advice to the Nutrition 
Committee.   The principles state that: 
 
“Nutritional risk analysis comprises three components: risk assessment, risk 
management and risk communication. Particular emphasis is given to an initial step 
of Problem Formulation as a key preliminary risk management activity.” 
 
(Codex, 2008) 
 
Therefore, the proposed draft principles state that a process of problem formulation 
should be undertaken prior to any risk assessment.  Problem formulation is deemed 
important in that “it fosters interactions between risk managers and risk assessors to 
help ensure common understanding of the problem and the purpose of the risk 
assessment.” (Codex, 2008), signifying an explicit recognition that risk assessment 
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should not take place in isolation from risk management.  According to Millstone 
(2009), since 2003 the Codex procedures have been structured around a ‘co-
evolutionary’ model of standard setting, a model which incorporates risk assessment 
policy in order to allow for discussion amongst risk managers and risk assessors 
before risk assessment is undertaken.  In the case of nutritional risk analysis, the 
inclusion of problem formulation was done with explicit recognition of the 
introduction of risk assessment policy in the Codex procedures.     
The nutritional risk analysis principles recognise that interactions should occur 
between risk managers and risk assessors.  The principles do not, however, resolve the 
question of who should provide scientific advice to the Nutrition Committee.  At the 
2007 meeting of the Nutrition Committee, the question of scientific advice for 
nutrition was raised during discussion of these principles.  The FAO representative at 
this meeting emphasised that FAO/WHO Joint Expert Groups give independent 
advice and should be probably be the only source of advice for Codex committees 
(Personal note, November, 2007).  The comments of the FAO representative came in 
response to the assertion in the nutritional risk analysis principles that: 
 
“Consistent with their important role in providing scientific advice to Codex 
Alimentarius and its subsidiary bodies, FAO and WHO are acknowledged as the 
primary source of nutritional risk assessment advice to Codex Alimentarius. 
However, this role does not preclude the choice of other sources of advice such as 
appropriate international expert groups or organizations [as well as national relevant 
expertise] if and when justified.” 
   
(Codex, 2008) 
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The FAO representative took issue with the suggestion that other sources of advice 
could be chosen by the Nutrition Committee.  Further, they stated that if a request for 
scientific advice is made by a Codex committee then the FAO/WHO are obliged to 
meet this request (Personal note, November 2007).  The delegation of Malaysia 
agreed that the FAO/WHO Joint Expert Groups should be the primary source of 
scientific advice.  In contrast, the delegation of the EC asked whether the text of the 
nutritional risk analysis principles should reflect the need to seek scientific advice 
from other sources.  The ability of the FAO/WHO to deliver scientific advice is 
crucial to standard setting in the Codex if the parent organisations are designated as 
the primary source of scientific advice.  This is problematic.  For example, the EC 
takes its scientific advice on food safety and nutrition primarily from the European 
Food Safety Authority (EFSA), not FAO/WHO Joint Expert Groups.  The FAO/WHO 
can assert its authority in the provision of scientific advice through reference to the 
FAO/WHO Framework for the Provision of Scientific Advice on Food Safety and 
Nutrition (FAO/WHO 2007), but this framework is applicable only to the sphere of 
international standard setting as conducted in the Codex and sister organisations (OIE 
and IPPC).  Likewise, other member governments of Codex take scientific advice 
from other national and international scientific expert bodies outside of the UN 
system. 
The lack of a standing committee for scientific advice on nutrition has not 
resulted in an absence of scientific input from the FAO/WHO in Codex standard 
setting.  In some instances, FAO/WHO have proactively provided scientific advice 
which has not been requested by risk managers.  As suggested earlier in this section, a 
longstanding source of contention within the Nutrition Committee has been the 
agreement of a definition for dietary fibre, as part of a Codex standard covering 
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‘Guidelines for Nutrition and Health Claims’.  In November 2008 a draft definition 
was finally agreed in the Nutrition Committee after more than fifteen years of 
discussion.  The definition has been sent for adoption by the Codex Commission in 
July 2009.   
 
What is dietary fibre? 
 
The contention over dietary fibre has, primarily, concerned the types of food 
components which can be classified as dietary fibre and so contribute to the fibre 
levels measured in food products.  Some food industry groups (such as the 
International Dairy Federation and the International Life Sciences Institute) favour 
broader definitions of dietary fibre than the classical association of fibre as present in 
fruits, vegetables and wholegrains.  Having a greater array of components classified 
as dietary fibre returns higher values for dietary fibre in food products, providing a 
platform for nutritional claims.  The broad definition also allows for the promotion of 
‘fibre rich’ ingredients in food manufacturing (such as Tate and Lyle’s Promitor™ 
Resistant Starch).  The broader definition also has support from some scientists 
working on dietary fibre and who coalesce around a method of fibre analysis 
produced by the Association of Analytical Communities (AOAC).  As discussions 
proceeded within the Nutrition Committee, a draft definition of dietary fibre was 
slowly developed along these lines. 
In contrast to the broad definition being developed in the Nutrition Committee, 
in 2007 the FAO/WHO presented evidence in the form of a Scientific Update (Mann 
et al, 2007) which asserted that term dietary fibre should only apply to “intrinsic plant 
cell wall polysaccharides.” (Cummings and Stephen, 2007: S13).  In essence this 
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definition limits dietary fibre to those polysaccharides found intact within fruits, 
vegetables and wholegrains.  The contribution of the FAO/WHO took place without 
the explicit request of risk managers for risk assessment input and, importantly, 
represented a significant departure from the broader draft definition which had been 
developed in the Nutrition Committee.  According to a member government delegate 
to the Nutrition Committee, the case of dietary fibre was a classic situation of 
scientific advice being produced in a competitive relationship with other sources of 
advice: 
 
“I think there is a real admission that there are other bodies around that are also 
[producing] sound science and have the adequate expertise to provide advice as well, 
whether it be from different national bodies or whether it be groups like the European 
Food Safety Authority or there a certainly a range of bodies you’d want to review all 
the evidence.  The classic would be dietary fibre.  If we as a committee had the only 
expert advice from FAO/WHO then we would be doing a complete turnaround on 
dietary fibre.  But we’ve picked up from the meeting there is huge resistance to that.  
So in some ways if you rely on one source of expert advice you are not actually 
looking across the totality of the evidence.” 
 
(Interview, November 2007) 
   
The Scientific Update attracted critical comments from some government delegations.   
Australia stated that it considered: 
 
that the process by which the revised FAO/WHO definition was prepared was not 
conducted in accordance with the FAO/WHO Framework for the provision of 
scientific advice and therefore does not provide a sound basis on which to consider 
the merits of the proposal. 
 
(Codex, 2007b)   
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In the 2007 Nutrition Committee, some member governments voiced their concern 
over the short amount of time available to review the Scientific Update.  As a result of 
this short period for analysis (one week), few member governments or non-
governmental organisations made interventions on the substance of the Scientific 
Update at that meeting.  However, the delegation of the EC suggested that a 
presentation made by a risk assessor on behalf of the FAO/WHO expert committee 
was: 
 
A suggestion which takes us back where we started many years ago.  Maybe this is a 
case of a scientist talking to a committee which takes scientific advice, but eventually 
writes up standards for the consumer.  We have to take decisions on scientific advice 
and this is not only advice coming from FAO/WHO, EFSA offer totally different 
advice.  I do not think a working group that sits down with FAO/WHO would really 
be advancing things. 
(Personal note, November 2007) 
 
Thus, the iterative process of risk analysis was taking place.  The FAO/WHO had 
intervened in the Codex standard setting procedure (risk management) using scientific 
advice (risk assessment) presented by a risk assessor (scientist) to risk managers 
(government delegates), some of who questioned the basis (risk assessment) of the 
argument (risk management).  The same risk assessor was asked by a government 
delegate at a subsequent meeting whether he thought his involvement in standard 
setting had compromised his scientific integrity “because I was a risk assessor and 
they were risk managers and the two should never meet.” (Interview, December 
2008).   
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 Concerns over the scientific advice being offered by the FAO/WHO on dietary 
fibre were voiced by some member governments.  In particular the EC – formally 
recognised as a member organisation of the Codex since 2003 - expressed strong 
disagreement with the FAO/WHO definition of dietary fibre.  The EC has competency 
on this issue amongst EU member states and an EC Directive covering the definition 
of dietary fibre was being negotiated alongside discussions in the Codex Nutrition 
Committee.  As a result, the EC was keen to ensure that the Codex definition 
corresponded as closely as possible to the proposed EC definition.  However, the 
definition proposed by FAO/WHO represented a radical departure from the closely 
aligned Codex and EC definitions.  The position of the EC was particularly 
problematic for the UK and US governments.  The UK favoured a definition of 
dietary fibre closer to that put forward by the FAO/WHO, as this conformed to the 
existing UK definition, but did not posses competency on the issue under EC law.  In 
the US, discussions over the definition of dietary fibre were on-going and no domestic 
consensus had been reached.  As result the US delegation could not commit to the 
Codex definition (as favoured by the EC) and instead chose to express a desire for 
further discussion.  A range of opinions existed amongst member governments over 
the form the definition should take, with some favouring the use of FAO/WHO advice 
(which only became available in 2007) and others aligning, to varying degrees, to a 
broader definition as developed in the Nutrition Committee. 
 The contention over defining dietary fibre in the Codex demonstrates that 
despite procedural movements towards a ‘co-evolutionary model’ of risk analysis 
(Millstone, 2009), the division between risk assessment and risk management is still 
used as a rhetorical device.  The division is mobilised in order to carry out boundary 
work (Gieryn, 1983).  However, in the case of dietary fibre the attempt to exclude risk 
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assessors from policy-making was unsuccessful, as the contention over the science of 
dietary fibre was closely entangled with the political negotiation of the definition and 
the implications of this for nutrition claims on food products.  Further, the FAO/WHO 
scientific advice contradicted the Codex draft standard that had been developed, by 
suggesting a radically different definition for dietary fibre. 
 Despite the controversial and conflictual nature of the discussions over the 
definition of dietary fibre, an agreement was eventually reached (or ‘fudged’ in the 
words of one commentator (Personal communication, January 2009)).  While the 
agreed definition is a compromise solution, three aspects leave it open to further 
interpretation.  Firstly, national governments are free to determine whether to include 
shorter chain polysaccharides (such as oligosaccharides) as dietary fibre (which were 
excluded in the FAO/WHO definition).  Secondly, the definition allows for the 
inclusion of synthetic and recovered carbohydrate polymers as dietary fibre (which 
were also excluded in the FAO/WHO definition), as long as these components can be 
demonstrated to have a physiological effect of benefit to health (which is not easy to 
prove).  Thirdly, national governments are free to determine the required nutrient 
content level for claims (‘source of’ or ‘high in’) made for dietary fibre in liquid foods 
(again, such claims were excluded by the FAO/WHO definition of dietary fibre).  
However, the important question of the most appropriate methods of analysis for 
measuring these components as been left for further discussion.  Therefore, the 
agreement reached in 2008 allows for flexibility in interpretation.  
 
Beyond epistemic communities 
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In the case of defining dietary fibre, the provision of scientific advice to the Nutrition 
Committee proved contentious.  Competing interests advocated different sources of 
advice.  The EC, supported by some industry groups, sought to develop a Codex 
definition in line with that being produced as part of an EC Directive and 
incorporating advice from EFSA.  The FAO/WHO contradicted this advice, while the 
US remained open on the definition due to domestic circumstances.  As Majone 
(1989) notes, in the standard-setting process competition between rival 
epistemologies, regulatory systems and values is often intense.  The contested nature 
of standard setting - as evidenced in the case-study of dietary fibre - poses particular 
problems for the concept of epistemic communities.  It is worth restating the 
definition of epistemic communities offered by Haas (1992a, p. 3): “...a network of 
professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an 
authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within the domain or issue-area”.  In 
order to be considered an epistemic community, networks of professionals are said to 
exert an authoritative claim to knowledge.  The case of the Nutrition Committee 
suggests that it is the authority of claims made by groups of scientists, not their 
scientific expertise, which is open to challenge.  International standard setting 
invariably brings together diverse regulatory systems and such encounters can lead to 
competition (Majone 2004; Geradin and McCahery 2004).   In this context it becomes 
difficult for networks of professionals to articulate authoritative knowledge claims.  
This does not mean such professionals are considered to be scientifically ‘inexpert’ or 
‘less expert’.  Instead, a lack of authority emerges from the diverse institutional 
context from which experts project their competing knowledge claims into a 
consensual policy-making process. 
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The case-study suggests that the division between science and policy-making 
is not fixed.  Although the official procedures of the Codex have been adapted to 
recognise that ‘problem formulation’ or ‘risk assessment policy’ is an important 
element of standard setting, the distinction between risk assessment and risk 
management is still used rhetorically in order to carry out boundary work (Gieryn, 
1983).  Boundary work in this sense delineates a difference been scientific experts 
(who can discuss scientific matters) and regulatory experts (who can discuss standard 
setting matters).  As Jasanoff (1987) suggests, boundary defining rhetoric is often 
used to structure the relationship between science and policy through the concepts of 
risk assessment and risk management.  However, in the case of dietary fibre, scientific 
experts carrying out risk assessment on behalf of the FAO/WHO proved able to 
transcend such rhetorical divisions and to act across science and policy-making.  
There is no suggestion that the scientific expertise of the different scientists involved 
in providing advice is called into question, rather their authority to engage in a policy-
making environment is challenged.  The division of risk management and risk 
assessment within Codex means that risk managers cannot directly question the 
scientific arguments made by risk assessors, despite now having the capacity to set 
risk assessment policy.  In this sense, the expertise of scientists involved in providing 
expert advice has to be recognised, not least because it has been termed ‘expert 
advice’.  However, risk management and risk assessment can become concepts which 
are used rhetorically as and when required.  Recall the statement of the EC delegate 
who emphasised that a scientific expert (risk assessor) should not engage in the 
conduct of standard setting (risk management), despite the close interrelationship 
between discussion of scientific advice and the production of a definition for dietary 
fibre. 
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 Contestation over scientific advice emerges from the lack of recognised 
authoritative claims to knowledge.  A relationship exists between the contested nature 
of knowledge claims in such circumstances and the significance of regulatory 
competition within international food standard-setting.  In the case of dietary fibre, 
dispute encompasses scientific experts who disagree on appropriate evidence and 
analysis and regulatory systems which are brought together under the 
intergovernmental fora of the Codex.  As a result, the assertion that unified, scientific 
knowledge can be established and applied to standard setting activities is to seriously 
misconstrue the iterations which take place between science and policy-making.  In 
such conditions there is little chance that a network of professionals can establish an 
uncontested and authoritative position in the sense used by Haas (1992a). 
  
 
Conclusion 
 
As a mode of agri-food governance, international food standard setting has important 
implications for the agri-food system.  However, the scientific and technical 
characteristics of the standard setting process serve to obscure the production of 
standards.  This article has examined the process of standard setting using the 
agreement of an international definition for dietary as a case-study.  The conflictual 
nature of the scientific advice offered in order to establish this definition did not 
prevent an international agreement on the Codex standard.  Instead the standard 
setting process was completed by producing a definition which could be interpreted 
by different actors. The agreement of a definition for dietary fibre required 
considerable negotiation in order to establish a Codex standard which could be 
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accepted by member governments.   The FAO/WHO attempted to assert primacy in 
the provision of scientific advice – supported by some member governments - but this 
advice was rejected by others (notably the EC).  The demands of industry groups that 
dietary fibre should be defined to include a broad range of components – beyond 
intrinsic plant-cell wall polysaccharides - could not be refuted on the grounds of 
scientific advice.  However, the requirement that the health benefits of such 
components be evidenced has enabled the scientific controversy to continue while 
allowing a resolution to the Codex process.   
The iterations between contestable science and contestable policy-making 
undermine the influence of epistemic communities to standard setting.  By placing 
emphasises upon the coherency of authoritative scientific knowledge claims, the 
concept of epistemic communities fails to address the means by which scientific 
controversy is produced and the impact this has upon the political processes.  In such 
circumstances, the competition between regulatory systems in standard-setting – each 
associated with particular configurations of scientific advice - means that the 
establishment of authority over knowledge claims and the associated political 
influence cannot be easily asserted. Although procedures in the Codex have been 
amended towards a formal process which encourages iterations between science and 
policy-making, the case detailed here suggests that the formulation of scientific advice 
and the standard setting process itself cannot be easily structured around a formal 
framework.  The diversity of advisory sources and negotiated settlement of standards 
means that the process cannot be restricted in this way.  Although the division 
between risk assessment and risk management can be used as a rhetorical device to 
conduct boundary work, the centrality of technical discussions to the standard setting 
process means that such a division is difficult to establish and maintain.   
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 In order to develop future analyses of agri-food governance, close and 
sustained engagement with technical policy-making processes – such as international 
food standard setting – is required.  Given that the agri-food system is, by and large, 
technology-driven, it is crucial that the trajectories of scientific, technical and 
regulatory decisions are subject to social science investigation (Lowe et al, 2008).  
Highly technical policy-making should questioned and the production and articulation 
of scientific evidence and advice conceptualised as constituents of such processes. 
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Figure 1: Organisational Structure of the Codex Alimentarius Commission (adapted 
from Codex, 2007a) 
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